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Since passage of the Sentence Reform Act of 1984 (SRA), 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(6) ("(a)(6)") has required sentencing judges to consider "the need to
avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records
who have been found guilty of similar conduct."' At the same time, the SRA also
required judges to adhere in most cases to the Sentencing Guidelines established
by the United States Sentencing Commission. The Guidelines specify a
particular weight to be given at sentencing to each of a host of specific offense
characteristics and dictate a narrow sentencing range on the basis of those
characteristics.' The mandate to sentence within that range (absent special
* Associate Professor, Marquette University Law School; J.D., Yale Law School, 1996; B.A., Yale
College, 1991; Editor, Federal Sentencing Reporter.
1. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) (2000).
2. Id. § 3553(b).
3. For a history and description of the Guidelines, see Michael M. O'Hear, The Original Intent of
Uniformity in Federal Sentencing, 75 U. CIN. L. REv. 749, 781-84 (2006).
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circumstances warranting "departure") left judges with little reason to puzzle
over the meaning of their duty "to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities."
In January 2005, however, the Supreme Court ruled in United States v.
Booker that the Guidelines could no longer be treated as mandatory.4 More
specifically, the Court rejected the Guidelines system as unconstitutional because
it required sentences to be increased on the basis of offense characteristics that
were not found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, but by a judge using the
preponderance of the evidence standard.' In order to address the constitutional
difficulties, the Court excised from the SRA the provision requiring Guidelines
compliance (18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)). 6 At the same time, the Court left other
provisions of the SRA in place, including (a)(6). Thus, with conversion of the
Guidelines from mandatory to advisory, the (a)(6) duty to avoid unwarranted
disparity may acquire new significance. Indeed, a perusal of the post-Booker
jurisprudence indicates that several district court judges have invoked this
provision in a variety of different circumstances to justify non-Guidelines
sentences.7
Appellate courts are now turning their attention to the important issues raised
by the (a)(6) cases, but a systematic account of the origin and purpose of the
provision is lacking. This article seeks to fill the gap, based on a close reading of
the text and legislative history of (a)(6). While neither text nor history supplies
perfectly clear answers to some of the questions now raised by the cases, I
nonetheless propose a new approach to (a)(6) that I believe is reasonably
consistent with the both the letter and the spirit of the statute. This approach both
provides a framework for judges to evaluate Guidelines sentences in a critical
fashion (as they are plainly authorized to do under Booker) and imposes
constraints on the ability of judges to assume an open-ended policy-making role
(as the SRA plainly did not intend for them to have). In brief, under my reading
(a)(6) requires that a sentencing judge consider the average actual sentence
imposed in past cases involving a similar offense of conviction and justify any
deviation from this empirical norm.
The article proceeds as follows. Part I outlines four different circumstances
in which (a)(6) has been invoked post-Booker to justify a non-Guidelines
sentence. Part II considers the text and history of the provision. Part III proposes
some principles to guide implementation. Part IV describes the role that (a)(6)
might play in a post-Booker world. Part V briefly reconsiders some of the cases
discussed in Part I in light of the principles discussed in Part III.
4. 543 U.S. 220, 245-46 (2005).
5. Id. at 226-27.
6. Id. at 258.
7. The post-Booker terminology remains problematic. I will use the term "Guidelines sentence" to refer
to any sentence within a range established by reference to the factors set forth in chapters two through four of
the United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual. I will use the term "non-Guidelines sentence" to refer to
sentences based on other considerations, including, but not limited to, considerations that would have been
considered appropriate grounds for a pre-Booker departure.
628
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 37
I. POST-BOOKER USES OF (a)(6)
In the year since Booker was decided, district court judges have invoked their
statutory duty to avoid unwarranted disparity in a variety of different
circumstances. This Part describes four particularly noteworthy types of cases in
which (a)(6) has been cited as a justification for a non-Guidelines sentence.
Collectively, these cases demonstrate the potentially far-reaching consequences
of a reinvigorated (a)(6) jurisprudence.
A. Ensuring Similar Sentences for Similarly Situated Co-Defendants
In the post-Booker world, the most common use of (a)(6) has perhaps been as
a basis for reducing or eliminating the differences in sentences that would
otherwise be imposed on co-defendants pursuant to the Guidelines. How would
application of the Guidelines result in co-defendant disparities? The cases
suggest a number of possibilities.
First, co-defendants might receive different sentences if they were sentenced
before and after the Booker decision. For instance, in United States v. Revock,
two defendants, Revock and Harris, "jointly carried out the theft of six firearms
from a licensed gun dealer."8 Harris was sentenced prior to Booker, but after
Booker's precursor, Blakely v. Washington.9 Between Blakely and Booker, judges
in the District of Maine, as in a number of other districts, required that
aggravating facts at sentencing generally be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt.'0 As a result of these procedural obstacles, Harris's sentence did not reflect
the fact that the serial number of one of the stolen firearms had been obliterated,
which would normally increase sentence length under the Guidelines.'1 Revock's
sentence, by contrast, was delayed until after Booker. In performing the
Guidelines calculus for Revock, the sentencing judge did take into account the
obliteration of the serial number. However, the judge chose to impose a non-
Guidelines sentence so as to equalize Revock's sentence with Harris's." The
judge reasoned that, because Harris and Revock had engaged in identical conduct
and had "virtually identical" criminal records, a Guidelines sentence for Revock
would "impede[] the statutory goal of sentencing uniformity." 3
Second, co-defendants might receive different Guidelines sentences as a
result of a prosecutor's decision to present aggravating facts as to only one
co-defendant. For instance, in Ferrara v. United States, a defendant gangster was
8. 353 F. Supp. 2d 127, 128 (D. Me. 2005).
9. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
10. Revock, 353 F. Supp. 2d at 128.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 129.
13. Id.; see also United States v. Colby, 367 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D. Me. 2005) (adopting the reasoning of
Revock in a case involving similar facts).
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re-sentenced post-Booker in connection with various mafia-related crimes.' 4
Co-defendants with similar or higher positions in the mob had already been
sentenced in connection with the same crimes. The government argued that
Ferrara's sentence should be increased on the basis of various factors that the
government, apparently pursuant to cooperation agreements, had not urged in
sentencing proceedings for the co-defendants, such as the murder of another
mobster. The sentencing judge refused to take these considerations into account
because they would result in unwarranted disparities in the defendants'
sentences.'5
Third, co-defendants might receive different sentences as a result of the
Guidelines' "substantial assistance departure." For instance, in United States v.
Strange, a group of jailhouse employees were convicted of depriving an inmate
of his constitutional right to be free of excessive force. 6 The sentencing judge
calculated the Guidelines range for Strange at twenty-seven to thirty-three
months. 7 However, two co-defendants, Hull and Rivera, had already been
sentenced and received fifteen and eighteen months, respectively.' 8 They received
lower sentences principally because they provided substantial assistance to the
government in the investigation or prosecution of another person.'9 The
Guidelines recognize "substantial assistance" as an appropriate basis for sentence
reduction.0 The sentencing judge concluded, however, that the operation of the
substantial assistance departure produced an excessive disparity in the Strange
case, and therefore reduced Strange's sentence to twenty-one months.2' The court
provided no explanation of why the disparity produced by a twenty-one-month
sentence was "warranted" when the disparity produced by a twenty-seven-month
sentence was "unwarranted." Nor did the court address whether the disparity
might have been more appropriately addressed by higher sentences for Hull and
22Rivera.
14. 372 F. Supp. 2d 108, 110-11 (D. Mass. 2005).
15. Id. at 121-24. For a decision that seems to reflect a more skeptical view of using § 3553(a)(6) as a
basis for mitigating prosecutor-created disparities, see United States v. Sandoval, No. CR-04-93-S-BLW, 2005
WL 1806418, at *2-3 (D. Idaho July 28, 2005) (refusing to reduce sentence based on lower sentences received
by co-defendants as a result of plea bargains).
16. 370 F. Supp. 2d 644,646 (N.D. Ohio 2005).
17. Id. at 650.
18. Id. at 651.
19. Id. at 651-52.
20. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5KI. 1(2004).
21. 370 F. Supp. 2d at 652.
22. For a similar decision, see United States v. Lee, 376 F. Supp. 2d 1276 (D. N.M. 2005). In Lee, the
drug trafficking defendant was subject to a minimum Guidelines sentence of 135 months, in contrast to a co-
defendant of "similar culpability" who received a sentence of only eighty-seven months under the Guidelines.
Id. at 1282. The disparity was driven by the fact that Lee possessed a firearm, while the co-defendant did not.
Concluding that the firearm did not fully justify the disparity, the judge reduced Lee's sentence to 120 months
pursuant to § 3553(a)(6). Id.
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B. Mitigating Federal-State Disparities
Federal law criminalizes much conduct that is also made criminal by state
law, such as drug trafficking, bank robbery, and mail fraud. Federal sentences,
however, tend to be far more severe.23 Prior to Booker, federal defendants relied
unsuccessfully in several cases on federal-state disparities as a basis for
downward departure from a Guidelines sentence. 4 Booker may breathe new life
into the argument that, at least in the sorts of cases typically handled in state
court, federal judges may appropriately adjust sentences so as to minimize
disparities between federal defendants and state defendants from the same locale.
For instance, in United States v. Bariek, the defendant was convicted of the
federal crime of operating an international money transmitting business without a
state license. 2' The judge calculated his Guidelines sentence as thirty-seven to
forty-six months 6 However, the defendant would have faced a one-year
maximum if convicted of the same conduct in state court.27 Moreover, the judge
found little distinct federal interest in the case, as there was apparently no
evidence that the illicit money transmittals had gone to support terrorism, drug
trafficking, or other criminal activities.28 The judge ultimately reduced Bariek's
sentence to eighteen months, based, in part, on the disparity with state law.29
C. Mitigating Inter-District Disparities
If federal-state disparities are conceptualized as "vertical" disparities, then
disparities across federal districts might appropriately be termed "horizontal."
Studies found important horizontal disparities even before Booker rendered the
Guidelines merely advisory.30 Much of the phenomenon seems a result of
different charging and plea-bargaining practices in the nation's ninety-four
United States Attorney's Offices (USAOs).3' As with vertical disparities, the
pre-Booker jurisprudence rejected such horizontal disparities as an appropriate
ground for departure,32 but Booker may modify the analysis.
23. Michael M. O'Hear, National Uniformity/Local Uniformity: Reconsidering the Use of Departures to
Reduce Federal-State Sentencing Disparities, 87 IOWA L. REV. 721,730-32 (2002).
24. For a discussion of the cases, see id. at 736-39.
25. No. 01:05CR 150JCC, 2005 WL 2334682, at *1 (E.D. Va. Sept. 23, 2005).
26. Id. at *3.
27. Id. at *6.
28. Id. at *4.
29. Id. at *6.
30. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING: AN
ASSESSMENT OF How WELL THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IS ACHIEVING THE GOALS OF
SENTENCING REFORM xii (2004) ("Notably, regional differences [in sentencing] in drug trafficking cases were
increased from the preguidelines to the guidelines era.").
31. Id. at xii, 92.
32. See, e.g., United States v. Banuelos-Rodriguez, 215 F.3d 969 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); United
States v. Bonnet-Grullon, 212 F.3d 692 (2d Cir. 2000).
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Indeed, several post-Booker defendants have already had success in seeking
sentence reductions on the basis of generous "early disposition" programs in
some districts. Congress has expressly permitted, but not required, USAOs to
create early disposition programs, by which defendants who plead guilty under
conditions particularly favorable to the government receive special sentencing
benefits.33 For instance, in United States v. Medrano-Duran, the defendant was
convicted in the Northern District of Illinois of illegal entry after deportation.'
Although thirteen districts have implemented early disposition programs pursuant
to statute for illegal reentry cases, the Northern District of Illinois has not.35
Medrano-Duran nonetheless argued that his sentence should be adjusted
downward to reflect the benefits he would have had available to him if convicted
in an early disposition district. Citing (a)(6), the judge agreed and imposed a
below-Guidelines sentence.36
D. Rejecting Guidelines Provisions that Create Disparity
The cases discussed above focus on disparities that are extrinsic to the
Guidelines themselves, for instance, disparities in prosecutorial early disposition
programs. Yet, a persistent criticism of the Guidelines is that they themselves
create unwarranted disparities through the formal distinctions they draw among
categories of defendants. These criticisms have been nowhere more vigorous
than as to the distinction drawn between crack and powder cocaine. Although the
two forms of cocaine produce essentially the same effects, with the one easily
"cooked" into the other, the Guidelines treat crack defendants much more
harshly. 37 Defendants involved with a particular volume of crack are treated as if
they had been involved with 100 times as much powder. For instance, trafficking
in 1.5 kilos of crack is treated as an equally severe offense as trafficking in 150
kilos of powder.38
Since Booker, several district court judges have invoked (a)(6) as a basis for
giving a below-Guidelines sentence to crack defendants.39 For instance, in United
States v. Castillo, the defendant was convicted in the Southern District of New
33. For a discussion and critique of the early disposition statute, see generally Michael M. O'Hear,
Localization and Transparency in Sentencing: Reflections on the New Early Disposition Departure, 27
HAMLINE L. REv. 358 (2004).
34. 386 F. Supp. 2d 943, 943, 944 (N.D. Ill. 2005).
35. Id. at 946.
36. Id. at 948-49. For similar cases in which sentences were adjusted to reflect the availability of early
disposition programs in other districts, see United States v. Galvez-Barrios, 355 F. Supp. 2d 958 (E.D. Wis.
2005); United States v. Ramirez-Ramirez, 365 F. Supp. 2d 728 (E.D. Va. 2005).
37. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, REPORT TO CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY
iv-v, 16-17 (2002).
38. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D 1.1 (c)(1) (2004).
39. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 359 F. Supp. 2d 771 (E.D. Wis. 2005); United States v. Castillo,
No. 03 CR. 835(RWS), 2005 WL 1214280 (S.D.N.Y. May 20, 2005).
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York for crack distribution. The Guidelines range was calculated as 135-168
months.40 The judge, however, determined that adherence to the Guidelines
would result in an unwarranted disparity between the defendant's sentence and
the sentences of other defendants who "engaged in substantially similar conduct
that involved powder cocaine rather than crack.",4' In order to mitigate the
disparity, the judge rejected the 100:1 crack-powder ratio of the Guidelines in
favor of a 20:1 ratio and sentenced the defendant accordingly to a term of eighty-
seven months.42
II. SUBSECTION (a)(6): TEXT AND HISTORY
As the cases discussed in Part I demonstrate, the (a)(6) duty to avoid
unwarranted disparity supplies a potentially powerful tool for judges seeking a
reason to sentence outside the Guidelines. However, the judiciary has not yet
developed a systematic framework for determining what is an "unwarranted
disparity" and when such a disparity may appropriately call into question a
Guidelines sentence. In order to lay a foundation for such a framework, this Part
analyzes the text and legislative history of (a)(6).
A. Text
The (a)(6) duty to avoid unwarranted disparity appears in a list of several
matters that the "court, in determining the particular sentence to be imposed,
shall consider., 43 The mandatory "shall" indicates that the court must consider
these matters. On the other hand, use of the term "consider" suggests that the
court is not required to give determinative weight to any particular factor.
For purposes of determining what sorts of disparities are to be avoided, the
statute indicates two parameters of concern. First, the disparities of interest are
more specifically identified as "sentence disparities among defendants with
similar records who are found guilty of similar conduct." By its literal terms,
then, the statute indicates no concern with the disparate (or, for that matter, non-
disparate) treatment of defendants who have dissimilar records or who have been
"found guilty" of dissimilar conduct. The term "found guilty," though, raises
important problems. In common usage, defendants are "found guilty" of crimes,
not conduct. What, then, is the unit of analysis: defendants convicted of similar
crimes or defendants who have engaged in similar conduct? In the next Part, I
will argue that "similar crimes" is the better answer.
Second, once we identify the defendants "with similar records who have
been found guilty of similar conduct," we need not avoid all disparities, but only
40. Castillo, 2005 WL 1214280, at *4.
41. Id. at *5.
42. Id.
43. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2000) (emphasis added).
633
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those disparities that are "unwarranted." But what makes a disparity
"unwarranted?" Consider an example: two first-time offenders are convicted of
bank robbery. One brandished a loaded gun during the crime, while the other
merely carried a toy gun in his pocket. If the former received a longer sentence,
would the resulting disparity be warranted or not?
Under one plausible reading of (a)(6), the answer would be determined by
reference to the Guidelines: if (and only if) the Guidelines authorize
consideration of a sentencing factor, then that factor might appropriately be used
as the basis for treating otherwise similarly situated defendants in a disparate
manner. After all, Congress gave the Sentencing Commission its own mandate to
"avoid[] unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar
records who have been found guilty of similar criminal conduct."" Congress, in
fact, directed the Commission to give "particular attention" to this mandate in
developing the Guidelines.4 ' The Guidelines might accordingly be viewed as the
ultimate arbiter of the boundary between warranted and unwarranted disparity.
While there might be some merit to this approach, two familiar canons of
statutory interpretation indicate that § 3553(a)(6) should not be read merely to
command adherence to the Guidelines. First, other provisions of § 3553(a)
expressly mandate "consider[ation]" of the Guidelines. 6 If (a)(6) were interpreted
to say the same thing, then the subsection would be redundant, in violation of the
Surplusage Canon. Second, if (a)(6) were read so as to give some particularly
heavy weight to the Guidelines, then the Guidelines might come too close to the
sort of mandatory system that the Supreme Court found unconstitutional in
Booker. This sort of reading of (a)(6) conflicts with the Avoidance Canon, which
indicates that courts should avoid interpretations of statutes that raise serious
constitutional questions.48
Indeed, upon closer inspection, the strict Guidelines adherence approach does
not seem terribly consistent with the structure of either the statute or the
Guidelines. For one thing, while Congress directed the Commission to avoid
unwarranted sentencing disparities, Congress also mandated consideration of
several additional matters in the development of the Guidelines, including the
need to "maintain[] sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sentences when
warranted by mitigating or aggravating factors not taken into account in the
44. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (2000).
45. Id. § 994(f).
46. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4)-(5).
47. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND
THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 833 (3rd ed. 2001) ("[I]t is a 'cardinal rule of statutory interpretation that no
provision be construed to be entirely redundant."' (quoting Kungys v. United States, 475 U.S. 355, 369 n.14
(1986))).
48. See Ernest Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preservation of Judicial
Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1549, 1550 (2000) ("Where Congress has attempted to do something that may intrude
on constitutional values ... courts resist this effort by insisting that Congress make its intent absolutely clear.").
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establishment of general sentencing practices. 4 9 The statute, in short, does not
contemplate that the Guidelines will constitute an exclusive and comprehensive
list of appropriate sentencing factors. Nor do the Guidelines themselves purport
to operate in this manner: the Guidelines permit "departure" from an otherwise
applicable sentencing range if "the court finds. . . that there exists an aggravating
or mitigating circumstance... of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into
consideration by the Sentencing Commission ... that ... should result in a
sentence different from that described" in the Guidelines .
In sum, an analysis of the language and structure of the statute suggests that
the judiciary is authorized to make an independent evaluation-that is,
independent of the Commission and the Guidelines-of what sorts of disparities
are unwarranted.
B. Legislative History
The SRA had its origins in a series of legislative proposals made in the
1970's.5' An especially influential early proposal was made by the participants in
a workshop sponsored by Yale Law School in 1974 and 1975.52 The "Yale"
proposal became the basis for a number of bills introduced by Senator Edward
Kennedy, a key congressional player in the sentencing reform movement and
original sponsor of the SRA.
53
The Yale proposal contained a series of "shall consider" provisions directed
to the sentencing judge,4 which constitute a clear precursor to § 3553(a). More
specifically, the Yale proposal mandated that the sentencing judge should
consider a set of traditional sentencing factors (gravity of the offense and the
needs for deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation, denunciation, and provision
of just punishment),55 which are all now (with some tweaking of the Yale
proposal's specific language) embodied in § 3553(a)(2). The Yale proposal also
called for the judge to consider these factors "by reference" to "any guidelines
promulgated by the United States Commission on Sentencing and Corrections, 56
which is not far off the present mandate of § 3553(a)(4) for judges simply to
"consider" the Guidelines. Absent from the Yale proposal, however, is any
apparent precursor to (a)(6).
49. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B).
50. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.0(a)(1) (2005).
51. O'Hear, supra note 3, at 756.
52. Id. at 763.
53. Id.
54. For the complete text of the Yale proposal, see PIERCE O'DONNELL ET AL., TOWARD A JUST AND
EFFECTIVE SENTENCING SYSTEM: AGENDA FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM 96-127 (1977). The "shall consider"
language is set forth (in substantially the same form) in § 2102(a) (for sentences of probation), § 2202(a) (for
fines), and § 2302(b) (for sentences of imprisonment).
55. See, e.g., id. at 107.
56. See, e.g., id.
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In January 1977, Senator Kennedy introduced Senate Bill 181 ("S. 181"), a
sentencing reform bill that was based on the Yale proposal. ' 7 S. 181 set forth 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a), which even more clearly anticipated what is now § 3553(a).
Using the same "shall consider" language of the Yale proposal, S. 181 offered a
laundry list of sentencing factors that are now duplicated almost verbatim in
§ 3553(a)(1)-(2)."s S. 181 also expressly mandated consideration of the
Guidelines.9 Like the Yale proposal, however, S. 181 contained no apparent
precursor to (a)(6).
Instead, (a)(6) emerged from the legislative consideration of Kennedy's 1977
bill. As reported out of the Senate Judiciary Committee, section 2003(a)(6) of S.
1437 required the sentencing judge "to consider the need to avoid unwarranted
sentencing disparity. '" The Committee Report was notably silent, however, as to
the purpose of this new provision. A terse, one-sentence description of (a)(6)
merely directed the reader to a discussion of the Commission's parallel duty to
avoid disparity, as set forth in proposed 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B). 6' Here, the
Committee was a bit more expansive:
This requirement establishes two factors-the prior records of offenders
and the criminal conduct for which they are to be sentenced-as the
principal determinants of whether two offenders' cases are so similar that
a difference between their sentences should be considered a disparity and
therefore avoided unless it is warranted by other factors. The key word in
discussing unwarranted sentence disparities is "unwarranted." The
Committee does not mean to suggest that sentencing policies and
practices should eliminate justifiable differences between the sentences
of persons convicted of similar offenses who have similar records. 2
In light of this language, the Committee apparently did not contemplate that
(a)(6) would result in strictly uniform sentences on the basis of criminal conduct
and record. Conduct and record would establish appropriate categories of cases
for comparison purposes, but disparities within these categories were not
necessarily impermissible, as long they were warranted on the basis of other
factors.
More about the "original intent" of (a)(6) may be gleaned from context. In
particular, the Committee's addition of (a)(6) was accompanied by other changes
57. O'Hear, supra note 3, at 763.
58. The only substantial difference is that § 3553(a)(2) permits consideration of rehabilitative needs,
while proposed § 3579(a)(2) did not.
59. S. 181, 95th Cong. § 3579(a)(4) (1977).
60. S. REP. No. 95-605. at 892. S. 1437 was a broader criminal law reform bill that incorporated
Kennedy's sentencing reform proposal. O'Hear, supra note 3, at 23. S. 1437 won passage in the Senate, but not
in the House. Id.
61. S. REP. No.95-605, at 892 n.30.
62. Id.at1161.
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to Kennedy's proposal that had the effect of diminishing judicial discretion. It is
hard to escape the conclusion that the two sorts of changes were linked. For
instance, S. 181 would have permitted the sentencing judge to depart if he or she
simply "makes as part of the record, and discloses to the defendant in open court
at the time of sentencing, a statement of the specific reason or reasons for the
particular sentence of imprisonment imposed. ' 63 The bill did not suggest any
particular limitation on the grounds of departure, aside from a general
reasonableness review that might be conducted on appeal.6' The S. 1437
Committee Report, by contrast, specified that the statement of reason for a
departure
would essentially be a statement of why the court felt that the guidelines
did not adequately take into account all of the pertinent circumstances of
the case at hand. If the sentencing court felt the case was an entirely
typical one for the applicable guideline category, it would have no
adequate justification for deviating from the recommended range.65
Put differently, the Committee contemplated a role for the sentencing judge that
was essentially empirical (is this case factually distinct from the typical case?)
and not normative (is the Guidelines sentence in this case a just sentence?). The
normative, policy-making role was left to the Commission.
The Committee specifically tied the Commission's policy-making
preeminence to concerns over disparity:
The need for consistency in sentences for similar offenders committing
similar offenses should be sufficiently important to dissuade a judge
from deviating from a clearly applicable guideline range simply because
it [sic] would have promulgated a different range. The offender before
him should not receive more favorable or less favorable treatment solely
by virtue of the sheer chance that he is to be sentenced by a particular
judge. A judge who disagrees with a guideline may, of course, make his
views known to the Sentencing Commission, and may recommend such
changes as he deems appropriate.66
While this language does not expressly reference (a)(6), the Committee almost
certainly had (a)(6) in mind: the belief that judges will be "dissuade[d]" from
inappropriate departures by the "need for consistency in sentences for similar
offenders committing similar offenses" clearly echoes the mandate for judges to
"consider" the "need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants
with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct." Thus, the
63. S. 181, 95th Cong. § 3579(b).
64. Id. § 3 742(c).
65. S. REP. No. 95-605, at 892-93.
66. Id. at 893.
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Committee that produced (a)(6) seems to have contemplated that the provision
would function, at least in part, as a check on inappropriate departures from the
Guidelines, specifically, departures motivated by a simple disagreement "by a
particular judge" with the Commission's policy choices.
As modified en route to Senate passage in 1978, Kennedy's 1977 sentencing
bill contained much of the key language that would ultimately be enacted into
law as the SRA.67 Enactment, though, awaited House approval, which did not
come until 1984. The Senate Judiciary Committee produced a new report on the
later legislation ("1983 Report"), which differed in some respects from the 1977
Report.
For instance, the 1983 Report did supply a brief explanation of (a)(6):
The[] provision[] underline[s] the major premise of the sentencing
guidelines-the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparity. The
subsection requires judges to avoid unwarranted disparity in applying the
guidelines and particularly in deciding when it is desirable to sentence
outside the guidelines.6
Thus, the 1983 Report, even more explicitly than the 1977 Report, linked (a)(6)
to the individual judge's decision about whether to deviate from a Guidelines
sentence. The 1983 Report did not indicate, though, that (a)(6) was intended only
to discourage deviations; rather, the language emphasized above seems to take a
more neutral position on the desirability of deviations, and at least suggests that
the duty to avoid disparity might sometimes support a decision to sentence
outside the Guidelines range.
In its discussion of (a)(6), the 1983 Report, like the 1977 Report, also cross-
referenced the Commission's duty to avoid disparity, as set forth in 28 U.S.C.
§ 991(b)(1)(B). In its discussion of this latter provision, the 1983 Report
duplicated much of the language quoted above from the 1977 Report.6 9 The 1983
Report, though, added this disclaimer:
[T]he sentencing guidelines system will enhance, rather than detract
from, the individualization of sentences. Each sentence will be the result
of careful consideration of the particular characteristics of the offense
and the offender, rather than being dependent on the identity of the
sentencing judge and the nature of his sentencing philosophy.0
67. KATE STITH & JosiE A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL
COURTS 40-42 (1998).
68. S. REP. No. 98-225, at 78 (1983) (emphasis added) [hereinafter 1983 Senate Report].
69. ld. at 161.
70. Id. (emphasis added).
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Thus, like the 1977 Report, the 1983 Report reflected a desire to minimize the
significance of the particular normative views of individual sentencing judges.7'
At the same time, the 1983 Report also emphasized the importance of a
thorough-going judicial assessment of the offense and the offender:
Under a sentencing guidelines system, the judge is directed to impose
sentence after a comprehensive examination of the characteristics of the
particular offense and the particular offender. This examination is made
on the basis of a presentence report that notes the presence or absence of
each relevant offense and offender characteristics [sic]. This will assure
that the probation officer and the sentencing judge will be able to make
informed comparisons between the case at hand and others of a similar
nature.
7 2
The Report, thus, apparently contemplated that the sentencing judge would look
not only to the Guidelines, but also to other cases "of a similar nature" in order to
determine an appropriately individualized sentence.
In sum, the legislative history emphasizes two (perhaps not entirely
consistent) principles. First, (a)(6) was not intended to function as an open-ended
authorization for individual judges to substitute their policy preferences for those
embodied in the Guidelines. But second, (a)(6) was also not intended to promote
a rigidly mechanical application of the Guidelines; judges were expected to
impose truly individualized sentences in each case based on a thorough
assessment of the offense and offender and a comparison with other similar
cases.
11. PRINCIPLES TO GUIDE IMPLEMENTATION OF (a)(6)
While neither the text nor the history of (a)(6) offers a systematic explanation
as to how the provision should be implemented, we may nonetheless construct a
reasonably coherent account based on the available sources. This Part
accordingly suggests several implementation principles.
A. (a)(6) Supplies a Potential Basis for Rejecting a Non-Guidelines Sentence
The SRA's legislative history reflects a pervasive concern over individual
judges imposing their own idiosyncratic normative views at sentencing.
Subsection (a)(6) responds to this concern by requiring judges to "consider," and
possibly defer to, the norms of their colleagues. The Senate Reports particularly
underscore the importance of this "consideration" in connection with a judge's
71. The Committee noted evidence that differences in the normative views of different judges was a
major contributor to sentence disparity. Id. at 44-45, 53 n.72.
72. Id. at 53 (emphasis added).
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decision to impose a non-Guidelines sentence. Indeed, based on the legislative
history, it seems fair to conclude that (a)(6) contemplates, among other things,
that judges will at least think twice before imposing a non-Guidelines sentence.
B. (a)(6) Supplies a Potential Basis for Rejecting a Guidelines Sentence
While the legislative history does not so clearly support the use of (a)(6) as a
basis for sentencing outside the Guidelines, neither history nor text precludes
such a use. Moreover, I have already suggested reasons, based on the Surplusage
and Avoidance Canons, why (a)(6) should not be read exclusively as a mandate
to think twice about the virtues of adhering to the Guidelines.
There is, however, a perfectly reasonable objection to this conclusion: if
Congress was so concerned about judges pursuing their own idiosyncratic
sentencing philosophies, then why should (a)(6) be interpreted so as to permit
judges to disregard the Guidelines? However, as elaborated in the next section,
(a)(6) contains an objective, empirical constraint on judicial discretion; that is,
sentences can only be adjusted based on (a)(6) to move them toward a
statistically based norm. Moreover, as both the SRA and its legislative history
make clear, Congress recognized that the Guidelines would be unable to identify
and properly weigh every relevant sentencing factor in advance; judges had to be
given some discretion to deal appropriately with unusual cases as they arose.
C. (a)(6) Contemplates a Two-Step (Empirical-Normative) Analysis
Subsection (a)(6) asks sentencing judges (1) to determine, for each case, the
sentences that have been imposed in similar cases and (2) to avoid unwarranted
disparities relative to the outcomes in those similar cases. The first step in the
analysis presents an empirical problem: what sentences have been imposed in
similar cases? The second presents a normative problem: would a disparate
outcome in this particular case be warranted? Both steps in the analysis present
important difficulties.
1. Step One: Defining the Baseline for Comparison
Consider the empirical step first. How do we know what body of cases to
consult for comparison purposes? Both the text and the legislative history point
to two key criteria in establishing the baseline: the statute, in the words of the
1983 Senate Report, "establishes two factors-the prior records of offenders and
the criminal conduct for which they are to be sentenced-as the principle
determinants of whether two offenders' cases are so similar that a difference
between their sentences should be considered a disparity. 73
73. 1983 Senate Report, supra note 68, at 161.
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There is an important difficulty, though, with the "criminal conduct" factor:
the formal offense of conviction may not do a very good job of describing a
defendant's actual criminal conduct. The Booker remedy decision nicely
illustrates the problem with two hypotheticals. First, there are the contrasting
cases of "Smith" and "Jones," both of whom violate the Hobbs Act:
Smith threatens to injure a co-worker unless the co-worker advances him
a few dollars from the interstate company's till; Jones, after similarly
threatening the co-worker, causes far more harm by seeking far more
money, by making certain that the co-worker's family is aware of the
threat, by arranging for deliveries of dead animals to the co-worker's
home to show he is serious, and so forth .
Although Smith and Jones may be convicted of the same crime, their actual
conduct has been quite different. Second, there are the contrasting cases of the
former felons "Johnson" and "Jackson:"
[E]ach ... engages in identical criminal behavior: threatening a bank
teller with a gun, securing $10,000, and injuring an innocent bystander
while fleeing the bank. Suppose prosecutors charge Johnson with one
crime (say, illegal gun possession) and Jackson with another (say, bank
robbery).75
Assuming Johnson and Jackson are convicted as charged, the true similarity of
their cases might be masked by the different formal offense of conviction.
So, for purposes of disparity analysis, should the baseline for comparison be
offenders with similar offenses of conviction or similar actual conduct? While
the matter is not free from doubt, my view is that offense of conviction is the
better answer, based on the statutory text, the legislative history, and the
constitutional values embodied in Blakely and Booker. First, the text of (a)(6)
refers to the conduct of which the defendant has been "found guilty," a phrase
that normally calls to mind formal conviction. In this regard, a telling contrast
may be drawn between the text of the statute as finally adopted and the
analogous, yet subtly different, language of a contemporaneous and competing
bill approved by the House Judiciary Committee. The House bill worded the duty
to avoid disparity this way: "[S]imilar offenders convicted of similar offenses
committed under similar circumstances should receive similar sentences. 76 The
italicized language clearly focuses attention on facts beyond the offense of
conviction; by negative implication, the absence of comparable language in the
statute that was actually adopted suggests a need to focus-at least in the
74. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 252 (2005).
75. id. at 253.
76. H.R. REP. No. 98-1017, at 2 (1984) (emphasis added).
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threshold determination of whether there is disparity (warranted or otherwise)-
on the offense of conviction alone.
This is consistent with the way that the term disparity is used in the
legislative history. For instance, in discussing the judge's duty to avoid
unwarranted disparity, the Committee Reports reference the Commission's
analogous duty in 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B), without suggesting any substantive
difference between the two. The Commission's duty, though, is specifically
framed as a duty to "avoid[] unwarranted sentencing disparities among
defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar criminal
conduct." Moreover, the 1983 Report seems to use interchangeably the phrases
"found guilty of similar criminal conduct" and "convicted of similar
offenses" 77-a formulation that even more clearly calls to mind the formal
offense of conviction.
Even more telling is the 1983 Report's discussion of the empirical evidence
demonstrating disparity in practice. Much of the comparative data used the
offense of conviction as the unit of analysis.78 For instance, the Report identified
discrepancies between the average sentence for bank robbery at the national level
(eleven years) versus the individual district level (five-and-one-half years in the
Northern District of Illinois). To be sure, the Report also discussed some studies
that purported to compare sentencing practices for particular subcategories of
offenses, defined by a combination of specific offense and offender
characteristics. 9 However, in the 'Report's terminology, sentencing variation
based on relevant offense and offender characteristics was also viewed as a form
of "disparity., 80 This does not mean, of course, that this type of variation was
disapproved of; in the Report's view, "disparity" may be warranted (good) or
unwarranted (bad). Rather, the point of immediate interest is this: when the
Report used the term "disparity," the Report seemed to contemplate comparisons
within broad categories of cases that were defined chiefly by reference to the
offense of conviction.
This interpretation is also supported by considerations of convenience and
deference to constitutional values. The offense of conviction, after all, is clearly
known before sentencing, while other conduct may be subject to legitimate
dispute even after conviction. Such "relevant conduct," to use the Guidelines
nomenclature,8' is determined at a post-conviction hearing by a judge, without the
normal rules of evidence and beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard that are
constitutionally mandated in criminal trials. Thus, using the offense of
77. 1983 Senate Report, supra note 68, at 161.
78. Id. at 41,41 n.21, 45.
79. Id. at 41-45.
80. See id. at 45 ("The Committee finds that this research makes clear that variation in offense and
offender characteristics does [sic] not account for most of the disparity.").
81. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1BI.3 (2005).
82. Id. § 6A1.3.
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conviction, instead of relevant conduct, in determining a baseline for comparison
under (a)(6) may facilitate a quicker resolution of (a)(6) issues. This approach
may also help the parties to have a better understanding pre-conviction of the
sentencing consequences of potential plea deals. Finally, an emphasis on
convictions, obtained through procedures that are subject to the traditional
constitutional safeguards, reinforces the core constitutional values on which
Blakely and Booker rest.
83
One final issue bears brief discussion: should the existence of disparity be
assessed by reference to local or national norms? The legislative history plainly
supports the national perspective. In particular, the empirical evidence of
disparity discussed above makes frequent comparison between individual
districts and national averages. 84 This does not necessarily mean that Congress
necessarily wanted national uniformity in sentencing-indeed, I have argued the
contrary elsewhere;8s it merely means that the baseline for empirical comparison
under (a)(6) should be national.
2. Step Two: Is Disparity Warranted?
Once Step One is completed, the sentencing judge in a given case will know
the national average sentence for other defendants convicted of the same crime as
the current defendant, say, eleven years for bank robbers. Does this mean that the
judge must impose an eleven-year sentence for the current bank robber? No; by
its explicit terms, (a)(6) only requires judges to avoid "unwarranted" disparities.
An eleven-year sentence would certainly be consistent with (a)(6), but might run
afoul of competing statutory mandates, for instance, to consider the Guidelines or
to consider the defendant's rehabilitative needs. If, in light of such competing
considerations, the judge is inclined to impose a disparate sentence, (a)(6) then
indicates a need to determine whether the disparity is warranted.
How is this to be done? As the 1983 Senate Committee Report put it, the
judge is to undertake "a comprehensive examination of the characteristics of the
particular offense and the particular offender .... This will assure that the...
judge will be able to make informed comparisons between the case at hand and
others of a similar nature. 86 In a typical case, there would seem little basis for
83. Consider, for instance, the Jackson-Johnson hypothetical discussed above. Johnson is convicted of
illegal possession of a firearm, while Jackson is convicted of the more serious crime of bank robbery. If Jackson
receives a harsher sentence, should this be regarded as a form of disparity? The view here is no: the sentences
cannot be appropriately compared. Johnson has never been "found guilty" of bank robbery, subject to all of the
procedural safeguards that would go into such a finding. To regard Jackson as an appropriate baseline of
comparison for Johnson would be to devalue the significance of the procedural safeguards and to encourage
prosecutors to undermine the safeguards by seeking punishment for conduct for which no conviction was
obtained.
84. 1983 Senate Report, supra note 68, at 41-45.
85. O'Hear, supra note 23, at 741-43.
86. 1983 Senate Report, supra note 68, at 53.
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deviating from general norms. In an unusual case, disparate treatment might, in
fact, be warranted.
Where a judge can identify something unusual about a case, though,
disparate treatment would not automatically be warranted. The fact that a bank
robber wore a pink wig, for instance, would certainly mark the case as an unusual
one,87 but would not, in and of itself, seem to warrant different treatment at
sentencing. In the end, the question of whether an unusual characteristic warrants
different treatment is a normative one; it is up to the sentencing judge to
determine whether disparate treatment is appropriate in light of the general
purposes of criminal sentencing.
At first blush, this reading of (a)(6) may seem hard to square with the intent
of the SRA to ensure that sentences are not "dependent on the identity of the
sentencing judge and the nature of his sentencing philosophy."88 However, there
are several important constraints on the individual judge's discretion in this area.
First, this decision, like all sentencing decisions under Booker, is subject to
reasonableness review. 9 The appellate courts can ensure that all decisions in this
area are rationally justified and can develop uniform guidance for the lower
courts over time.
Second, judges must heed a host of statutory commands. For instance, the
judge may not impose a sentence that is "greater than necessary" to comply with
the approved purposes of sentencing.9° If a sentencing norm identified under
(a)(6) exceeds this "parsimony principle" in a particular case, then any disparity
resulting from a decision to follow the parsimony principle should be treated as
per se "warranted." Likewise, the many statutory provisions addressed to the
Commission in 28 U.S.C. § 994 regarding the relevance of particular factors
should also be understood to apply to the judge. Thus, for instance, if Congress
has indicated that the Guidelines should be "entirely neutral as to the race, sex,
national origin, creed, and socioeconomic status of offenders," 9' it would seem
odd to interpret (a)(6) such that a sentence judge could rely on these factors as a
justification for otherwise unwarranted disparity.
Third, there are the Guidelines. Section 3353(a) commands that the
sentencing judge "consider" the Guidelines no less than the need to avoid
unwarranted disparity. Subsection (a)(6) does not authorize the judge to ignore
the Guidelines, and a decision to sentence outside the Guidelines range may be
subject to especially close scrutiny during reasonableness review.9'
87. See United States v. Blake, 89 F. Supp. 2d 328, 331 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (noting the bank robbery
defendant wore a pink wig).
88. 1983 Senate Committee Report, supra note 68, at 161.
89. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 261 (2005).
90. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2000).
91. 28 U.S.C. § 994(d) (2000).
92. Cf United States v. Mykytiuk, 415 F.3d 606, 608 (7th Cir. 2005) ("[Alny sentence that is properly
calculated under the Guidelines is entitled to a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness.").
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Fourth, there are directionality constraints. Subsection (a)(6) focuses
attention on the average sentence and authorizes judges to minimize deviations
from the average. The provision does not authorize judges to move away from
the average. Assume, for instance, that the average sentence for bank robbery is
eleven years. Assume further that the Guidelines sentence in a particular bank
robbery case is fifteen years. If the judge found this disparity to be unwarranted,
the judge might impose a sentence anywhere between eleven and fifteen years.
However, the judge would not-at least under (a)(6)-have the authority to
impose a sentence greater than fifteen years or less than eleven, no matter how
much the judge's personal views of the crime would push her in one direction or
the other.
IV. THE ROLE OF (a)(6) IN A POST-BOOKER WORLD
By my reading, the true significance of (a)(6) in a post-Booker world is that
the provision adds a distinct new factor to the sentencing calculus: the national
average sentence imposed in other cases in which a defendant with a similar
record was convicted of the same or similar offense. Of course, by the express
terms of the statute, this new factor would only have to be "considered." It is
entirely possible that this new factor would have little or no actual effect on
sentencing practices. On the other hand, there are good reasons to think that
(a)(6), as I understand it, would have a meaningful role to play.
First, there is the anchoring effect. Social psychology research has
demonstrated that the articulation of a number--even an arbitrarily selected
number-at the start of a decision-making process may play an important role in
shaping the final outcome.93 This may help to explain why Guidelines compliance
and overall sentencing severity have not changed in more dramatic ways since
Booker was decided.94 The Guidelines range is still routinely calculated and likely
anchors subsequent analysis. The national average sentence, if also routinely
identified as salient, might provide an alternative anchor, and thereby promote a
more open-minded approach to sentencing.
Second, (a)(6) focuses attention on the offense of conviction, suggesting the
centrality of this factor in the sentencing calculus and indicating that sentences
based on other factors must be specially justified. This approach supports the
constitutional values of Blakely and Booker, and demonstrates, at least
symbolically, that the post-Booker world is not simply business as usual.
93. See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2515-
19 (2004) (describing the anchor effect),
94. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SPECIAL POST-BOOKER CODING PROJECT 7, 14-15 (2005)
(indicating that, as of November 1, 2005, 61.7% of post-Booker sentences were within range and median
sentence was thirty-three months, as opposed to 69.4% and thirty months in FY 2003 (the last year for which
complete data is available) and 65.0% and thirty months in FY 2002).
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Third, while (a)(6) may not be an open-ended warrant for individual judges
to make sentencing policy in derogation of the Commission's role, it does
provide an additional opportunity for judges to bring to bear their personal
wisdom and experience. This may seem gratuitous in light of the much broader
mandate of (a)(2) for judges to "consider" a laundry list of basic purposes of
sentencing. Yet, many judges likely feel uncomfortable using the discretion
available under (a)(2) precisely because it is so open-ended. Some judges prefer
constraints on sentencing discretion as a matter of principle. 9 Others will at least
want to avoid the appearance of unbridled discretion for fear of a political
backlash.96 To such judges, (a)(6) may provide a comfortable middle-ground,
offering a new locus of discretionary judgment that was not available before
Booker, but one that is circumscribed by an empirical analysis of average
sentences imposed in similar cases.
V. ILLUSTRATIONS
The preceding discussion has been admittedly abstract. How would the (a)(6)
analysis play out in practice? Consider, for example, the Strange case discussed
above.97 Strange was convicted of a civil rights violation. The median sentence
for civil rights convictions is thirty-one months.98 Strange's Guidelines range was
twenty-seven to thirty-three months. Accordingly, (a)(6) would not provide a
basis for reducing Strange's sentence below the Guidelines. Indeed, (a)(6) would
have to be considered as a potential reason to reject a below-Guidelines sentence
on other grounds, unless the judge determined that any resulting disparity
(relative to the thirty-one-month average) was warranted.
Is this the right result? If the judge imposed a thirty-one-month sentence in
light of (a)(6), the sentence could be justified as one that was dictated by the
offense of conviction and the general judicial practices in cases involving similar
offenses across the country. To be sure, Strange is left with a longer sentence
than his co-defendants, but his co-defendants have done something that he has
not, that is, provided substantial assistance to the authorities. Indeed, basing one
defendant's sentence on co-defendants' sentences has an arbitrary quality to it.
What if Strange had been sentenced first? Would the subsequent sentences for
the co-defendants have been increased based on Strange's sentence? It surely
cannot be that the speed of case processing and order of sentencing should
determine severity of punishment.
95. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 355 F. Supp. 2d 1269, 1286 (D. Utah 2005).
96. Id. at 1287-88.
97. See supra text accompanying notes 16-22.
98. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STATISTICS 420 (31st ed. 2003). This data is the most recent available. In connection with crimes that are
prosecuted with relative infrequency, courts, when determining a baseline average sentence for comparison
purposes, might appropriately consider data from several years to ensure that the most recent year was not
anomalous.
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While the sentence in Strange seems a particularly arbitrary use of (a)(6), I
am also a bit troubled by the analysis in the other cases discussed in Part I. I do
not necessarily disagree with the fairness concerns articulated or the ultimate
sentences imposed in the cases, but they do smack of the sort of unbridled policy-
making decisions by individual judges that the SRA was intended to curtail. The
analysis in all of these cases would be strengthened by a showing that the
otherwise applicable Guidelines sentence exceeded established norms for
defendants convicted of similar offenses.
Consider Medrano-Duran, the illegal reentry case.99 The defendant sought to
take advantage of early disposition programs that were not available in his
district of prosecution. But why use (a)(6) to lower his sentence? Would it not
make as much sense to raise the sentences of defendants who were prosecuted in
early-disposition districts? Much as in the Strange case, there seems to be a
certain arbitrariness as to whose sentence moves and by how much. Looking to
actual sentencing outcomes may bring a somewhat objective constraint to the
analysis. Medrano-Duran would have been a more compelling case if the
defendant could have shown that not only do other districts have early-
disposition programs, but that those programs have been used in such a
widespread manner that they have had an appreciable effect on overall national
sentencing statistics.
Finally, consider the crack-powder case. This case raises a significant
problem for the (a)(6) analysis at the empirical step: Should the baseline for
comparison be other crack cases or other cocaine cases (including both crack and
powder)? While the drug statutes treat crack and powder offenses in a distinct
manner, (a)(6) focus on the treatment of offenders found guilty of "similar
conduct." There seems little reason not to regard crack and powder crimes as
"similar." The baseline of comparison for crack offenders should thus be the
broader category of all cocaine offenders. Where a particular crack offender's
Guidelines sentence exceeds the baseline norm, it is appropriate under (a)(6) for
the sentencing judge to inquire whether the resulting disparity is warranted.
VI. CONCLUSION
Subsection 3553(a)(6) had little significance prior to Booker, when the
sentencing analysis was dominated by the mandate of subsection (b)(1) to adhere
to the Guidelines absent a suitable ground for departure. In a post-Booker world,
(a)(6) potentially plays an important role in counterbalancing the statutory
mandate for judges to "consider" the Guidelines, helping to ensure the advisory
Guidelines are truly advisory. Moreover, (a)(6) does so in a particularly
appropriate manner, by refocusing attention on the offense of conviction, with all
of the attendant procedural safeguards, as a key sentencing consideration.
99. See supra text accompanying notes 34-36.
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The challenge is to implement (a)(6) in a manner that retains some deference
to the intent of the SRA to check the discretionary power of individual judges. I
have proposed a two-step, empirical-normative analysis that attempts to strike a
balance between the need to constrain discretion and the need for a robust
alternative sentencing framework to the Guidelines. Envisioned in this manner,
(a)(6) offers a new locus for dialogue within the judiciary over the meaning of
"unwarranted disparity" and an opportunity for judges to address the unwarranted
disparities created by an unduly mechanical application of the Guidelines
themselves.
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